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This assignment uses the theory of deconstruction to reflect on some discourses
that underlie the practices of psychology and psychiatry. The language of the
psychological professions is analysed in terms of its political implications. A
number of linguistic power hierarchies that are central to the practice of
psychology are deconstructed: the individual and the social, reason and
unreason, normality and pathology, form and content, theoretical categories and
real life, professional and lay views, and non-psychotic and psychotic language.
The concepts of justice (as understood within the Derridian paradigm) and care
are analysed, with specific emphasis on their practical implications in the
interactions between therapists and patients in real life psychotherapeutic
situations. This deconstructive process takes place in the intersection of my own
story as an intern clinical psychologist with the stories of some of the patients I '
have worked with during this year. The outcome of this process is a deepening
and broadening of the meaning of providing just and respectful mental health .'




Hierdie werkstuk benut die teorie van dekonstruksie om te reflekteer oor
sommige van die diskoerse onderliggend in sielkundige en psigiatriese praktyk.
Die taal van die sielkundige professies word ontleed in terme van moontlike
politieke implikasies. Daar is 'n dekonstruksie van 'n paar magshiërargieë wat
sentraal staan tot die taal van die sielkunde: die individu en die samelewing,
rasionaliteit en irrasionaliteit, normaliteit en patologie, vorm en inhoud, teoretiese
kategorieë en "die regte lewe", professionele en leke-posisies, en die taal van
nie-psigotiese en psigotiese pasiënte. Die konsepte van geregtigheid (soos
verstaan binne 'n Derridiaanse paradigma) en sorg word ontleed, met spesifieke
klem op die praktiese implikasies hiervan in die psigoterapeutiese interaksies
tussen sielkundige en pasiënt. Hierdie proses van dekonstruksie vind plaas in die
kruising tussen my eie storie as intern kliniese sielkundige en die stories van
sommige van die pasiënte saam met wie ek hierdie jaar gewerk het. Die gevolg
van hierdie proses is 'n verdieping en verbreding van die betekenis van
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Stellenbosch, June to October 2002
Dear Chris
"Would you tell me please, which way I ought to go from here?" Alice asked.
"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," the Cheshire Cat
replied.
"I don't much care where -", said Alice.
"Then it doesn't matter which way you go ... " said the Cat. (Carroll, 1994)
I have decided to write you a letter to tell you a story, or rather, stories. Stories of
people: of therapists, patients and all those involved in psychology and psychiatry ...
These stories are also of myself, my thoughts, feelings and experiences as a "neophyte
therapist", taking my first steps in the language and practice of psychology. Many things
in my own narrative have sparked this writing off. On a theoretical level, the philosophies
of meaning making, language and hermeneutics grasp my attention. On a practical
level, I experience a sense of wanting to be a "better" therapist, a "better" psychologist.
In a postmodern, post-structuralist era I understand this as meaning that I need to
deconstruct, "read again" and look again at how I use language, how I "speak politics",
and how I make decisions. Only by taking such a reflective stance will I be able to
provide a just and caring service to the patients I work with.
I will take this stance by using the theory of deconstruction to reflect on the concepts of
justice and care in the practice of psychology. I cannot but interweave the theory with
my own story, and with the stories of some of the people I have worked with this year. I
will have to tamper with some of the assumptions and power hierarchies that are often
taken for granted within the psychological disciplines. This letter is about sharing with
you my thought processes around some of the concepts that stand central to the current
practice of psychology: postmodernism, deconstruction, power, psychosis, reality,
justice, caring, giving, and the possibilities of dialogue between therapists and patients. I
want to emphasise that these are my readings, my "makings of meaning", my
interpretations, my co-writings, and do not represent a master narrative on any of the
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concepts I have mentioned. Rather, it is a picture I am painting of a part of my world.
This picture is painted with words like "deconstruction", "justice" and "care". The frame
that "holds" these concepts is that which inspired me to go on this journey in the first
place: my need to be a "better" therapist.
My story
It is 2002. At this stage in my life and career, I am working as a clinical psychology intern
in a state hospital in the Western Cape province of South Africa, that serves both in- and
outpatients, adults, children and families. These patients usually do not have medical aid
benefits, and often struggle to get by financially. Mostly they belong to a different socio-
economic class than the professionals and students working in these wards. The
economic divide between the haves and havenots is therefore quite pronounced within
this microcosm.
I have a small, yellow-walled office on an outpatient ward, and I also work with people
who are in the open (as opposed to locked) inpatient wards. Since this year's training
consists of rotating between different firms, I have also worked on the lock-up wards.
Around me are supervisors, psychiatric consultants and registrars, occupational
therapists, social workers and nurses. This is the first time in my training that I not only
learn about therapy, but actually also do therapy. Thus, my workplace is a place which
entails uncertainty as well as growing confidence, naiveté as well as exposure, finding
my own voice, yet listening to the voices of all the other members (often older and more
experienced) of the team on the psychiatric ward.
I am taking uncertain steps in and into the realities of "mental illness" and the discourses
of illness and health as spoken by "patients" and "health" "care" "professionals".
Sometimes it is a place of confusion for me, where I am continually faced with a
dilemma. On the one hand, I am learning the language of jaded cynicism (mostly spoken
by the more experienced professionals), on the other hand, I am feeling the need for
another, perhaps idealistic, language that is more hopeful, more liberated and liberating.
It is difficult trying to find words in this new language, yet simultaneously grappling with
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the need to have a distanced, self-reflective stance on these words. This seems to be
the dilemma that led others to adopt the position of jaded cynicism in the first place. This
dilemma contains others: being in a role that demands that answers be known, but
hardly ever knowing for sure, and acknowledging being in a more powerful role than the
patient, yet not abusing this power in any way.
In the hospital where I work, I find myself in the transitory stage where I still perceive
people as people ... but where they are becoming patients. My instinctive response
pattern to people is still shaped predominantly by the discourses I have learned while
growing up, discourses that centre around the "normal" everyday conducting of
interpersonal relationships and person-to-person communication and conversation.
What is emerging, however, is a "psychological discourse" that removes the "patients"
from the contextual fabric of everyday interpersonal life, and constructs them in the
discourse of mental illness. Subtly, over time, with enough exposure, this might become
the default language, my default language.
But this language seems to be flawed. It often uses limited, generic, "woolly" terms.
These terms (for example, diagnoses like Major Depressive Episode or Paranoid
Schizophrenia) force us only to want information from a patient that "fits in", that will not
escape this name. The stories patients bring are "shrinked" (Swartz, 1996) by translating
their words into the language of psychology. In this sense, with sufficient exploration of
the nuanced complexity of an individual, he or she will always become a diagnostic
problem. The complexity and multiple layers of personhood inevitably corrupt the identity
of patienthood. The diminished and diminishing nature and language of patienthood
often throws me, as a neophyte therapist, into an uncomfortable space, where I feel
confused, sad, angry. This discomfort makes me want things to be different, better.
Adam and Annie
This need to be "a better therapist" also happens in the intersection of my story with the
stories of the some of the people, the patients, I have had the privilege to work with
during this year. One of the first patients I worked with (I will call him Adam), is 26 years
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old. To me, he seemed to be a gentle and soft young man who often had difficulty to
stand up for what he wanted, both at home and at his work as a mechanic. He disliked
confrontation, and was going through a time where it seemed to him "as if everyone just
walked over him". This lead to his feeling abused and under-valued by those closest to
him.
This was translated into the language of psychology as follows: Adjustment Disorder
with Depressed Mood, according to the criteria of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (4th edition) (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
However, throughout the further course of his treatment, Adam presented with such
ambiguous symptoms that he was seen as being a constant diagnostic difficulty. As I
have mentioned, he presented initially with what were termed "dysphoric feelings
following work-related conflic!". After a week of being treated as an inpatient, Adam was
discharged. However, at outpatient follow-up a week later, he presented with "manic
symptoms": not sleeping, euphoric, elevated mood, laughing for no apparent reason and
grandiose ideas about his own strength and invincibility. Again he was admitted to the
ward. A few days later he started complaining about hearing voices (apparently they
have been speaking to him for over a year by then): Schizophreniform Disorder was now
considered as differential diagnosis. Even later he started swallowing pieces of iron
which he got from the desks in the ward, "because the voices told him to". Then he
reported visual hallucinations: three people coming to visit him once in a while. He was
also experienced as being "aggressive" and "agitated" with a very "labile mood" on the
ward. Pre-admission substance use (mostly cannabis) was suspected. Different
psychiatric drugs were tried - eventually the patient became quite sedated with "blunted
affect" at times, but even this fluctuated.
One day in a ward round discussion about Adam a nurse said to the doctor: "He is a
psychopath. He must go home. It is just behaviour, nothing else. I have never met such
a manipulative patient in my life". This statement, and others like it, bother me.
"It is just behaviour" seems to imply that this patient's "illness" is not really pathology, it is
something of less importance, and therefore too trivial to warrant treatment on the ward.
4
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
Somehow Adam becomes marginalised and is shifted to the periphery by this statement.
The nurse's point of view seems to become the central narrative. "It is just behaviour"
Adam was said to be "acting out". Here "acting out" refers to a type of action that has a
negative connotation, that should be "kept in". The word "acting" also implies some sort
of pretence, as opposed to someone whose illness or need is real. This in turn carries
the implication that there could be simulation of symptoms and malicious intent on
Adam's part, thereby reinforcing the allegation of "manipulation".
Adam was seen as disruptive, a problem, both diagnostically and behaviourally. Little
effort was made to understand the possible complex layers of Adam's behaviour. He
was not asked to share his opinion on the origin and meaning of his symptoms. Because
he was troublesome, because he did not fit the moulds that were pre-shaped for him,
because he did not have the vocabulary to articulate exactly how he feels and
experiences things, he was pushed aside. Literally sometimes: in seclusion. Figuratively
sometimes: all people who attended this ward round now knew him as the "problem
patient" with the diagnosis of "just behaviour".
What happened with Annie concerned me in a similar way. She is a teenage girl who
was admitted with a history of severe traumatic life events: rape, assault and the death
of a parent. Emotionally she was, in her words, "in a very dark, cold and hopeless
place", considering suicide as means of escape. After some time on the ward her
behaviour was occasionally labeled as "manipulative": her tears still flowed freely in
some situations and in others not. She sometimes wanted to participate in group
activities, but sometimes not. She vacillated between "socialising well" and "isolating
herself'. Occasionally she complained of physical symptoms such as headaches,
stomach aches and vomiting that did not quite fit in with the clinical picture of the Major
Depressive Episode (MOE) and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSO) that had been
diagnosed. At one stage Annie told me that she was worried about the stomach ache
and nausea she had been experiencing for the past few days. When I asked the nursing
staff to notify a doctor so that Annie could be examined medically, I was told that "it
would not really be necessary since she is probably only manipulating, and only
imitating some of the symptoms an eating disorder patient in the ward was presenting
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with". This opinion, in my mind, may have been an accurate observation ... but may also
have not. I did not know. However, ignoring Annie's complaint and refusing her a
physical examination may have had a profoundly negative impact on her perception of
the quality of care she was receiving, whether she was somatising or simulating or not.
When reflecting on the stories of these two patients, I again find myself in the middle of
the difficulty in positioning myself: feeling the discomfort and wondering what to do about
it. Do I keep quiet? Do I speak? What do I say? Do I trust these professionals, who have
years and years of experience and speak with such authority, or do I open my mouth
and place myself in the role of the fresh-eyed, naïve critic, and the idealistic, neophyte
psychologist? Do I choose to expose myself to the same risk of being dismissed or
patronised? Do I try to convince myself that I am indeed too young and sensitive, and
agree quietly to adopt the language flavoured with jaded cynicism?
I still do not really know, but my discomfort with the glib way many words
("manipulating", "behaviour problems", "borderline" or "passive aggressive") are used,
leads me to pause and reflect on some of the unexamined discourses in the practice of
psychology. I hear the words describing those patients that abscond, who rebel against
the system, who are non-compliant, who want to go home, and I wonder if we are aware
of what we do when we say these words, and what saying them leads us to do.
Then someone says: "Perhaps I would do the same if it were me in there", and for a
brief moment we all recognise and acknowledge the possibility of becoming a patient,
confined to the locked ward, confined to patienthood and the names that describe it. It
moves like scared fingers, this feeling of "There but for the grace of God go I...". Then it
passes and I talk about other things: the weekend, the next patient, and I choose to
forget. I choose not to stand still and not to push the pause button on my pre-recorded
actions.
For me, the unsettling factor in this notion of "moving on quickly" is linked with the
tensions implicit in the ethics and standards of care. What does "care" mean? To
"handle with care" implies both fragility of that which is being handled, and a cautious,
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thorough carefulness on the part of the caretaker. To "take care" in the (mental) health
care system means to be conscious of not doing any harm or damage. "Being careful"
would also imply taking enough time to pay close attention to individual items or units,
individual people and the differences between them.
Even when the motivation behind working as a psychologist is noble and just (wanting to
care and to help), I sometimes seem to mess it up. In my work with inpatients,
outpatients, families, individuals, depressed, anxious, happy, well-functioning,
malfunctioning persons, I am often not careful enough ... This seems to happen when I
assume the expert position, the role of the master diagnostician, who classifies and who
has the answers. It happens when I unthinkingly speak the language of a system which
seeks for the "lowest common denominator" in order to make clear diagnoses, and
implicitly shrinks the uniqueness and autonomy of those for whom it is designed.
Deconstruction
Before taking the time to reflect more deeply on some of these disquiteing discourses, I
need to say something about the philosophy of deconstruction, and describe the tools I
will use to tamper (maybe in the same way as a troublesome and difficult patient!) with
some of the unquestioned constructions in the practice of psychology. (Between
brackets: in this letter I will mostly refer to "psychology", rather than "psychiatry". This is
in contrast to the way the profession of psychiatry is often highlighted above psychology,
especially in "psychiatric wards", where psychology is often seen as a supplementary
service. Yet psychiatry and psychology also function alongside each other, both in state
hospitals and in private practice. In the current mental health system there are overlaps
between psychology and psychiatry - for example, the use of the DSM-IV for diagnostic
purposes. Therefore the references to and discussions on psychology are also relevant
to psychiatry.)
However, before discussing the tools I will use to tamper with some of these
unexamined discourses, I need to say a few things about the toolbox. Postmodernism
often is described as a reaction to the idolatry of reason, rationality and the militaristic
7
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
desire to "make everything fit nicely" by using the hard compartmentalising practices
associated with modernism. Sometimes postmodernism is conceptualised as the natural
evolutionary development of modernism itself. The term can also have a more
qualitative ring to it, so that postmodernism could well have existed before and during
the heyday of modernism itself (Culler, 1983). Whichever way it is viewed (and all are
legitimate viewpoints that can co-exist in a postmodern world!), postmodernism brings to
mind associations of playfulness, of stretching boundaries, of blurring great divides, of
troublesomeness, of looking again, and reading and re-reading and re-re-reading.
Everything is "read" and interpreted as a text with many authors, readers, co-authors
and accompanying discourses. Nothing is cast in stone. There is not only one voice.
One criticism of deconstruction is that it is too theoretical, and has no practical,
outcome-based relevance. This argument fails to understand that deconstruction is
philosophy in the market place at its best. Deconstruction is politically active.
Deconstruction cannot take place in the abstract, that is, without substantial, practical
and relevant content, a "real world" text, that lends itself to be deconstructed, that auto-
deconstructs. For example, deconstructing the way gender discourses operate has
consequences for our ideas on the position of women and men in society, in terms of
voting rights, salary policies, motherhood, fatherhood, womanhood, manhood.
Deconstructing the way psychological terms function on a theoretical level has
implications for the way future clinicians will go about the politics of the profession,
which eventually impacts on practice.
It seems that people are often averse to terms such as "deconstruction" and
"postmodernism" , because these words conjure up images of a lawless society where
"anything goes". It seems as if deconstruction is somehow equated with destruction.
Then it is understandable that a fearful attitude of "I'd rather have nothing to do with this
postmodern deconstruction" originates. I agree with Derrida, that this fear and shut-eyed
avoidance of deconstruction, might be an indication exactly of its practicality and its
political nuances (Cilliers, Degenaar & Van der Merwe, 1999). The resistance against
deconstruction also might have something to do with the way a deconstructing stance
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makes things more difficult. When things are more difficult they take more energy,
thought, care and time ...
Then there is the difference between deconstruction and critical psychology. Anyone
can be critical of anything, anyone can argue for or against something in sound, logical
rhetoric. In the arena of critical psychology one standpoint replaces another, one
argument is refuted by another. Deconstruction is different. Its agenda is different.
Rather than providing solutions, it is more interested in questions: "[I]t stays around long
after the party is over, it stirs and liquefies, and doubts itself and its methods ... " (Morss,
2000, p.109). It is like the multi-headed monster Sloan (2000) describes as follows:
[It is] tearing with its claws and teeth at the sides of [dominant psychology],
ripping at its theories, its practices, its impact on common sense, its failure to
address social problems in a significant way... [But] the monster's claws and
teeth also tear at itself, for it senses that it cannot be sufficient. (p.233)
Back to the tools. Deconstruction means (among other things!) looking in the margins.
Reading between the lines, seeing also the "negative space", looking at how that what is
said takes on meaning also in terms of that which is unsaid. What is omitted in
psychological conversation (by both patient and clinician) also bears meaning. When I
ask Adam certain questions (for example, "Are you hearing voices today?"), I choose not
to ask other questions (for example, "How do you feel about the conflict between you
and your brother?"). Of course, these questions can both be asked, and many more
questions can be asked. But due to practicalities like time constraints the therapist and
the patient are forced to choose only a few of the questions and comments from the pool
of a myriad possibilities. The same holds for the therapist's writing of process notes.
From all the words spoken in the session, I deduce a few themes, I choose which were
the "important" parts of the session, and these I write down. I might choose to comment
on Adam's "clinical picture", on his report of hearing voices, on his mood. I might write
only about Adam, and omit my own feelings in the session. I might choose to omit what
he said about his attraction to a girl in the ward and what he said about his frustration in
the ward. Paradoxically, I find myself sometimes choosing not to write down in the free-
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for-all hospital file that which I view as the important parts. The precious and intense
moments, such as an honest and vulnerable letter of sadness Annie has written to me at
the end of therapy, I sometimes want to keep "sacred", and thus choose to omit them
from my process notes.
Deconstruction would then mean to listen also for what is said in the silences, in the
unwritten, unspoken words. This means looking beyond what is in the centre, reading
the footnotes and flashing the light onto that which is supposed to be of less importance.
What a deconstructing reading does, is to show how these "subordinations" are of
utmost importance for the "better", the "privileged" terms to function in a semantic
system. There is a so-called "double movement" once such an opposition (where one
term is privileged and another subordinated) has been found in a text: (a) a turning
around or "reversal" of the opposition and (b) a "displacement" of the whole dichotomy
between the two terms (Culler, 1983, p.85). In this way deconstruction is not just
criticism, but moves on another level as well.
Reading, writing, speaking
Derrida (in Culler, 1983) provides an example that makes this more tangible: he
deconstructs the opposition of speech and writing, where speech is the "privileged term"
and writing is the "subordinated term". The "text" in which this opposition is eminent, has
to do with the way philosophers, and especially thinkers who have been concerned with
the way meaning is conveyed through language, have "written" a text of what kinds of
language are trustworthy and good, and what kinds of languages are not (Culler, 1983).
When I speak to you, it is presumed that there is a "presence of meaning": I am here,
you are here, we are at the same place at the same time, and meaning can flow easily
and straightforwardly from my consciousness to yours.
However, when I write to you (like now), this presence of meaning is of course not there:
you might read my letter months after I have written it, you might not be sure of the
meaning of some of the words I used, you might wonder about "what I am trying to say".
There is an absence of immediate meaning. In your reading, you have to co-write. You
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have to be an active participant in the meaning making process, because my
consciousness is not readily available to yours, thereby constructing the opposition
where speech is privileged over writing. But language and communication always
implies meaning that is not readily available. Both speaker and listener are constantly
caught in an absence of meaning. This is often forgotten when we speak to each other:
we speak and listen and "understand" under the illusion of direct availability of meaning.
However, when we write and read, we are aware of this meaning-making process. In
this sense, the term that has been subordinated (writing) is now privileged over the term
that was originally seen as the "better term" (speech). There has been a reversal. But
there is also a displacement. Speech and writing are not viewed as one being "better"
than the other (whichever way around). They are in a sense qualitatively "equated" as
both being processes of active, dynamic meaning making where there is a "generalised
absence" of direct meaning (Culler, 1983, p.95). There is a new way of looking at this
opposition - a liberating new mindfulness of the functioning of language in both
speaking and writing.
This manifests in the text I am reading in the setting of the practice of psychology in
different ways. On the one hand, speech is privileged over writing. If I want to confer
with a colleague or supervisor around a problem or patient that really worries me, I
would be hesitant to do the "consultation" in the form of notes or quick letters written to
each other. I would feel that I will not be able to communicate my specific concern as
well and as seriously as I would when talking about the problem or patient. On the other
hand, writing is often privileged over speech. Referrals are often written and not only
spoken about. Written suicide contracts bear more value than verbal ones. In privileging
either speech or writing, we might find ourselves in a place where "pure meaning" is
assumed, both in speaking (conversations with patients and colleagues) and writing
(process notes and referral letters).
In therapeutic interactions with patients, the presence of meaning is also often assumed.
When I speak to a psychotic patient, for example, I might take for granted that her
consciousness and the meaning she attaches to the words she uses, is readily available
to my consciousness, without mediation. When she says, "two voices are speaking
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loudly in my ears", I might fall into the trap of believing that I know exactly what she
means. When I read the process notes my predecessor has written, I might believe I
"know" the patient she has written about. (Ironically, this picture I form in my head when
reading up on a patient before I see him or her, is sometimes proved wrong and always
proved skimpy when I then actually meet the person.) When I listen to Adam telling me
he is "stressed", I might assume, prematurely, that his definition of this term is the same
as mine when I say "I am stressed". When Annie cries with me, or she complains of
nausea, or she speaks to me about her darkness, I might think I understand completely,
thus, that there is a direct "presence of meaning" in our interaction. However, after the
deconstruction, this "sorted out" way of interpretation becomes jeopardised. As I do
when reading poetry, letters or any other form of written language, I am interpreting,
mediating, and dynamically creating meaning when I interact with patients and
colleagues.
Différance
This idea of the absence of meaning takes form in one of Derrida's most used terms,
différance. For the development of a term such as différance, the scene is set by De
Saussure's structuralist approach, in which he developed a linguistic theory of the
interplay between sound and meaning (Kenny, 1994), placing specific emphasis on the
arbitrary relationship between signifier (the sound) and signified (the thing it is meant to
represent). De Saussure introduced the notion of linguistic meaning being constructed,
not in the inherent "meaningfulness" of each sound, but rather in the system of
differences between sounds that enables us to make meaning. Derrida would agree that
meaning is worked up by a system of differences, yet he argues that there is no such
one-to-one correspondence between signifiers and signifieds as De Saussure has
proposed. ''There is no fixed distinction between signifier and signified ... meaning is not
immediately present in one sign" (Jarup, 1988, p.33). Meaning is thus always relational
and relative to some other signs, some other meanings. As mentioned, Derrida coins the
term différance - partly referring to De Saussure's point of difference and relationship as
being the locus of meaning (Culler, 1983). (The discussion of the other dimension of
differénce will be deferred for the moment.)
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This notion of meaning being born in a system of differences can be interpreted both
linguistically and more in terms of "stories and things". When Annie speaks of the rape
she has experienced, she speaks not only of the rape as one thing on its own. Her story
of the rape takes on meaning in relation to her other experiences of trauma (for
example, this trauma is "the worst of them all", and "the other things that happened
made me even more vulnerable to the effects of this rape"). The rape is conceptualised
in relation to other possible traumas such as being robbed or being murdered. It takes
on meaning in relation to the meaning she attaches to being a male or a female, and in
relation to the discourses her family and cultural group hold regarding rape. The times
Annie has experienced as being non-traumatic also shape her understanding of times of
trauma. The "one" story holds in it traces of a myriad of other stories or ideas against
which it is compared, other narratives which help shape the meaning of this one.
The meanings Annie has attached previously to words such as "love", "sex", "making
love", "penetration", "violence", "victim" and "violation", shape her understanding of the
word "rape". For Annie, who associates closely with a church group that positions itself
against pre-marital sex, sex was semantically related to a committed marital relationship
for which one is supposed to "spare one's sexuality". Therefore, for her, being raped
also bears the meaning of now, in her words, "being spoiled for marriage one day",
which leads to tremendous feelings of guilt. For her, rape is nuanced in terms of
contamination. Her understanding of the rape can also be framed within her
conceptualisation of the word "victim". Annie has grown up in a house where her family
often responded to crimes like rape or assault with comments such as "maybe the victim
deserved it, maybe he or she was asking for it". These comments were imprinted in
Annie's system of meaning making, with the expected consequence that she kept
ruminating about whether she was perhaps too skimpily dressed on the day of the rape,
whether she was actually the one who was at fault... Her story of the rape is thus co-
authored by her other stories.
In a similar way, the words Annie uses to describe the "place" she is in emotionally ("it is
dark", "it is cold", "I am helpless", "I am hopeless") take on meaning in relation to their
"opposites". Annie feels darkness (not light, not sun), she feels cold (not warm, not
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secure, not held close to someone). She feels helpless (not helpful, not with help),
hopeless (as opposed to hopeful). There are lacks. If, in her mind, therapeutic change
would mean a movement from this place, it will surely be useful not to concentrate only
on taking away darkness, but also working on that which is written between the lines, on
a shaping of a sense of light and warmth.
On a more linguistic level, "each word or concept carries within it all other words and
concepts that are different from it... each word differs from, is evaluated against, and
also incorporates its opposite in a fluid and contextual sense" (Hepburn, 1999, p.634).
However, these other words get lost or forgotten somewhere along the line in the
process of our construction of meaning. This subordination gives rise to the oppositions I
have written about earlier: the illusion of one term being the "superterm" and the other
terms as being pushed out further and further out into the margins. One term gets to be
"privileged", its "opposite", the one that helps to constitute meaning, becomes of lesser
worth, the "supplement" (Culler, 1983). The reliance of each term upon its opposite is
obscured in its everyday use. "Normality", for example, gets privileged over its
"opposite", "abnormality", in such a way that, in our everyday use of the terms, we
almost forget how these two concepts shape and form each other. The same holds for
"having a DSM-IV Axis I diagnosis" and "not having a diagnosis". When it comes to the
warranting of therapy, having a "real diagnosis" might privilege a certain patient above
one who does not. What would it mean for the legitimacy of psychotherapy, for example,
if Annie was either diagnosed with a Major Depressive Episode, or not diagnosed at all,
conceptualising her misery as "going through a difficult and sad time"? V-codes and
"normal reactions" often get marginalised and subordinated. It is forgotten that both
"diagnosable pathology" and "normal reactions" conceptually mould each other into
meaningful terms. Deconstruction is then about finding these oppositions, turning them
around and displacing them.
As mentioned, différence also contains another meaning apart from "difference".
"Deferral" is also included in this neologism. Signs defer to each other: "every meaning
contains traces of other meanings" (Culler, 1983, p.96). There is an infinite play of
differing and deferring. Jarup (1988) writes: "Each sign in the chain of meaning is
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somehow scored over or traced through with all the others, to form a complex tissue
which is never exhaustible" (p.36). The implication of this "deferral" is that meaning is
not always readily available. According to Maze (2001),
... before an incoming idea could have meaning, we would have to compare it
with the trace we retained from its predecessor. Its meaningfulness would be
deferred ... [This means] that the only way we can say what a term means, is by
referring to its relation to other terms, which in their turn need further explanation,
and so on. (p.409)
Again, to come back to the stories of Adam and Annie, to do therapy within the
framework of deconstruction would mean not to assume that "true and absolute
meaning" is always available here and now. For the patient (as well as for the
therapist!), the meaning of therapeutic conversation or dialogue is often deferred. In my
mind this deferral is both "backwards" and frontwards". By "backwards" I mean into the
past, into the labyrinth of previously made meanings and experiences. Annie might
understand my way of engaging with her trauma in different ways (for example, as
patronising, respectful, permissive, or anything else). This understanding emerges from
the traces of previous meanings she has in her mind, previous experiences with other
therapists, previous ideas and discourses around how people treat or should treat
traumatised persons. Also, there is a "frontwards" deferral, a deferral into the future. The
meanings Adam and I attach to the therapeutic conversation we enter into now, will not
necessarily be the one and only meaning that will be attached to it forever. "[E]arlier
meanings are modified by later ones" (Jarup, 1988, p.36): the story of the time spent
with Adam might take on new meaning for me as I come into contact with more patients,
as I read more, learn more, hear more stories and live more stories. It might take on new
meaning for him as he continues his life, as he comes into more contact with more
people, read more, learn more, have more life experiences ... Maybe, in a few years
time, he will attach more positive value to our encounter. Maybe, in a few years time, he
will think more and more of it in a negative light. Even when the distinction between
positive and negative is discarded, his feelings and rememberings, his ascribed and
mediated meanings, might just be different from the way it is constructed now. It is not
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fixed, neither for him nor for me. There is a "backwards" and "frontwards" deferral. Every
meaning contains traces of other meanings ...
This is a whole mouthful on the "tools" of deconstruction I am going to use when I turn to
deconstructing some oppositions found in the text of psychology. The notions of
"absence", "trace", and "marginilisation" become important when we speak about the
way we speak about patients. It takes no special insight to see how the terms
"subordinated" and "margins" and "oppression" are related to the psychological
professions. Historically, psychiatry has been associated with straight jackets, both
physically and metaphorically. It was not a liberating profession. It often chained people
down, it was often a way and means of social control, a kind of special police keeping
everyone more or less from being too disruptive, too scary. Many things have changed.
But many things have not changed. Injustice, and even cruelty, have become more
subtle, more sanitised by politically correct speech, and therefore less detectable. The
words of Bas (1995) come to mind: "There was a time when you paid with your life, but
the times have changed, and now you are simply silenced to death".
In our everyday use of language it happens that some terms get "silenced", while others
gain linguistic strength to be in the privileged position of standing above these
supplementary terms. This sets up the hierarchies that come into play in our everyday
politics, and also in the politics of the mental health care system. There are many
hierarchies in this system that I can choose to deconstruct. I know that even by choosing
to deconstruct only some, I am already giving privilege to these "chosen few" above all
the others that are also at play and can also be deconstructed. However, if I were to
choose everything, it actually would not have been much of a choice! So I am choosing
my "frame" here, and in this frame I am going to look only at a few hierarchies: the
individual and the social, reason and unreason, pathology and normality, form and
content, theoretical categories and real life, as well as professional and lay views. The
hierarchies that I choose are all ingrained in the therapeutic encounter and conversation.
Unpacking these hierarchies is emblematic of the way the power imbalances implicit in
the language that labels different groups of people (for example, those who are "normal"
16
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
or "pathological") can be deconstructed as a way to providing a more just, caring and
respectful service.
Individual and social
According to Parker, Georgaca, Harper, McLaughlin and Stowell-Smith (1995), the
opposition of "individual and social" reproduces a Cartesian dualism inherent in modern
Western culture. Psychology tends to individualise problems, to make the locus of
mental illness one patient. This has the (quite convenient) implication that society does
not bear blame and does not carry responsibility for its "mentally ill". But when we look
closer at how we understand the term "individual" semantically, this point of view
becomes problematic. There can be no "individual" if there is no society, no "abnormal
population" if there is no "normal population" to compare them to. This links with the
notion of meaning making in a Saussurian system of differences. For example, if I were
the only person on an island and there were no other people to compare myself to, I
would not be tall or short, fat or thin, old or young ... in fact, no adjective describing me
would have meaning if there were no comparative group. (This is also evident in the way
statistical research is done with control groups and experimental groups.) In the same
way I cannot locate a certain kind of pathology in one patient (for example, agoraphobia)
if I do not have a control group, other people who also experience milder and worse
agoraphobic anxiety symptoms. Annie's reaction to her life stressors can only be
conceptualised as PTSD when it is compared to how other people react to traumatic
events. Adam, who is seen as "mad", "bad" and "sad", only gets these descriptions in
comparison to what is supposed to be "the norm" (sane, good and happy). The fact that
"pathology" is planted in everyone, on a very broad continuum, in fact makes differences
apparent and comparisons possible. This makes it more difficult to think of "individual
pathology" in a strict, either-or, compartmentalised way. The boundary between the
"healthy" psychologist and the "sick" patient is thus opened by the embeddedness of




One response to the opposition where the individual is privileged over society, could be
simply to turn this around and to privilege the societal over the individual. Examples of
such a response could be family approaches or feminist theories. Annie's mother,
stepfather and sisters can be called in to look at the way family interactions might "feed
the pathology" or have an ameliorating function. In this way, both "illness" and "recovery"
are not necessarily fixed in only one individual. However, this movement away from
pathologising only one person can be sabotaged if there is a conceptualisation of one
family member (for example, Annie) as "the index patient". Then again would there be a
scapegoating, a pathologising of one person, a (negative) privileging of the individual
above the societal. Paradoxically, in the bigger context of the whole of society, a family
(consisting of more than one individual) can be viewed as being a unit, "one thing", an
individual entity with its own characteristics and set identity. Subsequently, one family
can be pathologised as been dysfunctional ... which again situates abnormality in one
unit, one family. Indeed, the boundaries between the individual and her societal context
become blurry.
Moving away from the tendency to pathologise one individual, Annie's rape and
subsequent "illness" can be defined within the language of feministic cultural critique.
Feminist theory broadens pathology to a phenomenon that originates and grows in
societal power imbalances between the different sexes. Annie's rape can be
conceptualised as being the result of a man living up to societal discourses around
issues of masculinity (for example, "a man is just a man with normal instincts", or that it
is acceptable for a man to be the aggressor, also on a physical level). Her helplessness
and depression can be conceptualised as being part of a female identity. Her feelings of
responsibility and guilt regarding the role of her dressing style in the rape, fit in with the
gender stereotype of the woman as "seducer", therefore, as the one initiating (and taking
responsibility) for further sexual advances by the man. Feminist theories would thus
approach Annie's "illness" from a critical stance against this kind of "societal pathology".
When privileging the individual, and when privileging society, there is a breakdown. If we
privilege the individual only, the opposition crumbles. This happens since the individual
is always an individual as compared to others, always an individual against the backdrop
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of society, always someone whose pathology and meaning is constructed in relation to
others. Adam can not be seen as Adam the island: his symptoms take on meaning only
in relation to how the majority of people ("the normal population") function and conduct
their walk and talk. His "pathology", or lack thereof, is constructed in comparison to what
I and other team members, for example the nurses, have previously experienced from
other patients, as well as from the our interaction with the "normal population out there".
Yet there is also a breakdown if we think of society as being the privileged term: this just
becomes too abstract. If some intervention need to be made, and we say the "problem
lies within society", then society should be the focus of our intervention. However, to
state that "society must change" will change absolutely nothing, exactly because it is so
very vague. The only way to bring about change, whether for one person or more
generally in a society, is then to make the individual (even if it is many individuals) the
object(s) of intervention, the locus of change.
This leaves us with a kind of Heideggerian "under erasure" state of both individual and
society, where both exist, but in such a manner that each term cannot stand on its own
semantically. Annie is an individual, but her identity is also shaped by her family, her
society, and the Zeitgeist in which she finds herself. The way her "illness" is
conceptualised needs to encompass both her individuality and her position in a socio-
cultural-temporal framework. The way her "healing" or "recovery" is viewed will then
logically and automatically recognise and acknowledge both sides of this coin.
Reason and unreason
Often patients who are struggling with "severe psychological illnesses" are seen to be
highly irrational, and even unreasonable (which implies that there is some kind of
maliciousness or deliberate "difficultness" on their side). If they only could see reason ...
then they would think differently and act differently. Foucault (1994) writes critically
about the "psychiatric asylum as the place of opposition, the scene of confrontation",
where unreason, madness and a "disturbed will" must come into contact with a clinician
with a "sound will and orthodox passions" (p.42). Basaglia defines the psychiatric
hospital as "an institution [that is characterised] ... by a clear-cut separation between
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those who hold the power and those who don't" (in Foucault, 1994, p.45). The meeting
of these "haves and havenats" then becomes "a process of opposition then, of struggle
and dominance" (Foucault, 1994, p.43). The outcome of this meeting, this struggle, will
be presumed to be a victory for the sound will and reason.
Western Enlightenment privileges rationality above irrationality, reason above unreason
(as seen also in current trends such as cognitive psychology where "dysfunctional" and
"irrational" ideas and beliefs are to be replaced with more functional and rational ones).
Yet Foucault and Derrida ask whether it is possible to "talk of unreason" - since any
attempt to do so colonises unreason and transforms it into reason (Parker et al., 1995).
The assumption is that language then becomes "the coloniser", and that putting a thing
into words takes away some of its madness, its unreason. In saying that Adam's
behaviour is "unreasonable", we identify and classify and "make sense", "make reason",
of his "madness", thereby diminishing the non-sense, the unreason it was viewed as
originally. "Reason" as privileged term experiences breakdown, since (a) it is possibly a
term that "says nothing" in terms of semantic value in a system of difference (since, as
showed, it cannot be placed as opposition to unreason because to talk of unreason
makes it reasonable) and (b) reason is always a constructed concept (culturally and
situationally) and is therefore not some essentialist ideal that fell from heaven.
What would happen if the "reason and unreason" opposition were only turned around,
thus privileging unreason or irrationality? We are faced with the same problem - we then
enlighten the "heart of darkness" so that it is no longer dark. Unreason becomes reason
by virtue of being put into words. However, privileging unreason, throwing up our hands
and declaring defeat by unreason, might also "be abnegating ourselves of the
responsibility to help and understand others, and besides, ignores the constructed
nature of the opposition [between reason and unreason]" (Parker et al., 1999, p.61).
To "make a patient see reason" (for example, trying to get Annie to stop having an
"unreasonable" response to trauma, such as deep depression and constant crying) by a
process of opposition might assume (wrongly) that there is one essential, universal idea
and ideal of what and how reason is. Rather then, than patronising Annie's reaction as
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"unreason", it can be viewed as her "reason", her legitimate making sense of her
situation. This, however, does not have to leave me as therapist in a powerless state of
just having to say "yes, Annie, that is so". I can challenge her mode of thinking and
perceiving by entering into conversation with her, by opening up a space where the two
of us can have a dialogue around what has happened to her and in her. My "rationality"
or "reason" then stands alongside hers, without subordinating her way of making sense
as "unreason". If I work with the assumption that unreason inherently implies something
bad and destructive, I put myself in the difficult position of having to annihilate unreason.
However, if unreason is understood as a kind of reason, then therapy would be more
concerned about holding the tension between different "reasons", different narratives
(for example, mine and Annie's).
Normality and pathology
In a way this opposition flows from the two previous ones: an understanding of mental
illness is often seen to be situated in that part of the individual that is not "normal", not
like the rest of society, and "unreasonable". Furthermore, there is an implicit qualitative
judgement that to be "normal" is good, and to be "abnormal" is bad. The parameters of
normality are constantly in flux, though: homosexuality, for example, nowadays is not
seen as "abnormal pathology" as it was conceptualised in recent diagnostical manuals.
Because it is not "abnormal" anymore, it is also not as bad anymore.
Through the ages there have been different representations of madness - could it be
that the "same thing" was being described with different words and terms, for example,
"suspiciousness" and "Paranoid Schizophrenia"? This would encourage a highly
modernistic assumption about psychological illness, namely that there is some
"universal given", some essential symptoms that were just described differently in
different time frames. This would also assume a one way interaction between signifier
(the term or description) and signified (the "thing" that is being "put into words"). It would
assume that Annie's post-traumatic anxiety and depression would have been exactly the
same way she experiences it now, even if the words "depressed" and "anxious" were not
offered to her as a way of explaining or making sense of what she feels. This would be a
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negation of the way words and descriptions can influence the world as such. According
to Parker et al. (1999), "such an approach betrays an essentialist and acontextual view
of history" (p.58). Annie could have read a pamphlet on PTSD beforehand, thereby
finding a way to make meaning of what she experiences. In her own mind she might
even have been more focused on her symptoms of reliving the rape, numbing and
avoidance, and "ignoring" other things she might be experiencing that are not written
into the DSM-lV's diagnostic criteria of PTSD. Selective attention might be narrowing
and shrinking her story in modernist fashion.
A subsequent question that comes to mind is: "Might there be some truth in the view that
the delimitation of a psychiatric concept actually 'creates' cases which fits is
description?" (Parker et al., 1999, p.58). One cannot say that someone is depressed or
anxious unless these words are culturally available (that is, we have access to these
words and know what they mean). Patients often arrive at my door complaining of their
symptoms in the available language: "I feel depressed", "I am stressed", "I have
problems with my nerves". Thus, the identification and categorization of pathologies and
people are at least dependent on, if not entirely created within, language (Parker et al.,
1999).
If it is assumed that there is an interactional relationship between signifiers and
signifieds, for example, symptoms and our language to portray them, it might be useful
to look at the political implications of our psychological words. What does a diagnosis
do? And what will happen if we decide to abolish terms that can be seen as labeling or
stigmatising, for example, saying a patient is "psychotic"? Parker et al. (1999) feel that it
is debatable whether such an abolition would necessarily be the best thing to do (even
when done with the noblest of intentions): "If the term 'psychotic' were abolished,
another term would creep in to take its place once the chance is given for the polarity
[between normal and abnormal] to be reconstructed" (p.110). Thus, we should beware
of feeling comfortable too soon, feeling satisfied prematurely after we have dethroned
some politically loaded terms. While we may be using the best available signifier, we
should not stop questioning it, and go on looking for a better one that avoids the traps of
the former one. This new term will also be subject to deconstruction. Deconstruction is
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ongoing, it is never finished, it never really arrives, and does not want to either.
Deconstruction prompts all professionals in the mental health system to be aware of the
power of language constantly, not to forget the powerful, yet deconstructable, politics of
diagnostic terms.
On the point of diagnosis: who can diagnose "pathology"? Who can distinguish between
normality and abnormality, sanity and insanity? Only those who are "normal", those with
the "sound minds"? Scheff (1975) writes about deconstructing this "sane and insane",
"normal and pathological" opposition, arguing "against. .. misleading labels such as
schizophrenia, and the harmful isolation of patients in institutions ... [showing] that we
can no longer treat the mentally ill as social lepers. Instead, we must find more effective
viewpoints and procedures if we are really to help ... " (p.161). Rosenhan (1975) asks the
question I have raised in the previous paragraph: "If sanity and insanity exist, how shall
we know them?" (p.54). Who shall know them? Who are the judges who call the shots?
Who are the decision-makers that separate sanity from insanity, pathology from
normality?
Within the mental health system, the judges, those who are supposed to make decisions
that are congruent with the notion of justice, are mostly the doctors, the psychologists,
the "professional experts". But no matter how much we as "mental health professionals"
may believe that we can tell the normal from the abnormal, "the evidence is simply not
compelling ... [N]ormality and abnormality, sanity and insanity, and the diagnoses that
flow from them may be less substantive than many believe them to be" (Rosenhan,
1975, p.54). Different clinicians say different things... And apart from this, another
problem arises with the "wooliness" of descriptive terms such as "sanity", "insanity",
"mental illness", "schizophrenia". Different things are normal in different cultures. And
"culture seeps into every clinical judgement a mental health professional makes ... "
(Parker et aI., 1999, p.60). I might not have such a great hold on things as I believe I
have. I might want to consider letting go of one, final master narrative. In Adam's case, I
and other members of the team of professionals showed the tendency to make him as
"difficult patient" responsible for being a diagnostic problem instead of questioning the
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diagnostic categories themselves. Looking critically at the categories would of course be
much more uncomfortable for us ...
Is it then possible to distinguish madness or pathology, and even to distinguish degrees
of (in)sanity?
Trying to answer these questions Rosenhan (1975) conducted an experiment. "Sane
people" were admitted to psychiatric wards to see what would come from it. After being
admitted on account of "hearing voices", these "patients" claimed back their "sanity"
rather quickly. But "despite their public show of sanity the pseudopatients were never
detected... They were usually discharged with a diagnosis of 'schizophrenia in
remission'" (p.58). Interestingly enough, though, some other patients, the "real patients",
challenged the pseudopatients in saying they (the pseudopatients) are not crazy but a
journalist or professor checking up on the hospital.
On the one hand, privileging normality then becomes incompatible with the rules of
logic. On the other hand, a turning around and a privileging of abnormality and a
subordination of normality does not bring us anywhere, it just poses the same problem
in a different way. Again, an ability to hold this tension might be more meaningful and
therapeutic than having to decide on which of the two terms to privilege and which to
subordinate. This would have the implication that patients need not be pressured to
switch dramatically from abnormality to normality. Therapists also need not feel the
pressure of taking responsibility to convince the patient to switch from "illness" into a
flight to health. Rather than trying to annihilate all "pathology" desperately, the therapist
and the patient can unpack the consequences the patient's point of view and behaviour
have for her, without ever mentioning normality or abnormality. By not pathologising
everything the patient brings, and rather holding the tension between "normality" and




I sometimes get the feeling that, in terms of diagnosis, it is more important that someone
hears voices than what the voices are actually saying, more important that someone
gets flashbacks after a traumatic event than what the flashbacks are about. This would
signify a privileging of form above content (maybe as part of some search for generic
abstractions in a copying of the medical model). Nobody really cared about Adam's
anxiety which was related to the voices telling him "that they are going to kill him", it was
more important that he was suddenly reporting that he hears voices. In order to be able
to diagnose Annie's PTSD, the fact that she had flashbacks from the traumatic event
was more important than exactly what their content was. Again, in my mind, this would
mean a "shrinking" of people's stories, and also a therapeutic under-utilisation of the
richness of their narratives. In an approach that does not acknowledge the content of
symptoms like flashbacks or hallucinations, the person is reduced to a patient, and
alienation between patient and therapist could be a logical consequence. Again, as a
neophyte therapist, I have to find my balance between the languages that speak of
personhood and patienthood ...
Privileging form over content breaks down theoretically, because "many of the decisions
about form are dependent on content (is a delusion persecutory or grandiose? Does the
thought come from the person or from outside?)" (Parker et aI., 1995, p.62). However,
one cannot simply turn the opposition around and privilege content alone, since content
is always mediated in some form. A further question that comes to mind, is whether
"content" is not just perhaps another form of "form". The "title" "grandiose delusion" is
indeed also an abstraction, a heading, a part of the outline or form of the diagnostic
system. Yet, this structure cannot stand if it is but scaffolding - it can not be devoid of
content, for it would then defeat its own purpose. To say that Annie relives especially the
part of the traumatic event where the rapist is approaching her on the street (the
content), can be conceptualised as flashbacks (the form). For the best therapeutic
intervention, I believe it would be helpful for me and for her to hold both of these in mind.
By holding the form, both of us can "frame" the flashbacks as something which have
been recognised as such also in other survivors of trauma, thereby de-pathologising her
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symptoms. By holding the content, I can be respectful to her individual experience, her
individual identity and memory.
Form and content are thus two distinct concepts in one sense, but in another they are
nothing but sides from the same coin. Content cannot exist without form, and form can
actually also not exist without content, and the language which describes and classifies
is both form as well as content.
Theoretical categories and real life
A desperate adherence to the empirical authority of positivism often implies that "one
avoids discussing the inevitable ambiguities of the individual patient" (Parker et al.,
1999, p.62). The avoidance of individual ambiguity might correlate with the form and
content opposition in the sense that the contradictory or ambiguous content of the
patient's pathology (for example, not having avoidance behaviour after a traumatic
event) does not want to fit into the form, or the language, of a specific diagnosis (for
example, PTSD). Sometimes I find myself speaking of "typical" or "atypical" pathologies,
thereby dividing patients into (a) patients whose symptoms and complaints fall into the
privileged category of "being easy to diagnose, or having "typical pathology", even
"language and accounts I can trust" and (b) those who do not fit snugly into a DSM-IV
box, those whose accounts are ambiguous, those whose linguistic accounts of their
experience, their life world remain suspect. As I have mentioned, Adam is one of these
suspect characters ...
Linking to this hierarchy, Derrida's deconstruction of the speaking and writing opposition
comes to mind. There is an implication of "presence of meaning" with the patients whose
pathology fall into the first category, and an implication of absence of meaning with the
more "atypical presentations". Yet, within the context of deconstruction, meaning is
always made and mediated, through language, through the patient, through the clinician,
through cultural and historical discourse. Therefore, the patients who do not fit the mould
become emblematic of every single interaction with every single patient and every single
diagnosis we make. Adam is not an exception to the rule in the way that his "clinical
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picture" lets us struggle to make sense of what is happening in and with him. Rather, he
becomes a "symbol" for the process happening within every "clinical" conversation.
Patients like Adam pull us from the "forgetfulness" we so often fall into with the
diagnostically "easy" patients. Real life and the complex process of meaning making
within a myriad of voices and discourses, seep into every understanding and diagnostic
process.
In trying to get the "messiness" of real life to fit into clean diagnostic categories, the
person under discussion is often equated with the illness. The patient does not have
psychosis, he is psychotic. Annie does not have depression, she is depressed. The
person's identity becomes enmeshed with the identity of the illness, in fact, the patient
becomes the illness. In the work experience I have had, I have found the approach of
narrative therapy to provide some escape from this trap: "the problem is the problem,
the person is not the problem" (White, 1989, p.6). In externalising the problem, the
patient is de-pathologised. An identity apart from the identity of the problem that has
been seeping into the person, can be re-established. Annie can broaden her identity
from someone "who is depressed" to "someone who is working on the problem of
depression" .
On the topic of diagnosis, Kleinman (1991) comments on the importance of the personal
and professional history of any clinician. He makes it clear that every writer writes from a
specific "window", from some angle which is highly dependent on the road the writer has
walked to get to that window. No one can claim a master narrative. In connection with
this, he asks: "What is a psychiatric diagnosis?" (p.11). Kleinman (1991) cites Turner:
"Disease is not a fact, but a relationship and this relationship is the product of a
classificatory process ... " (p.11). He looks anthropologically at the diagnosis of an
"abnormal mental state such as delusions or hallucinations", and gives an example of
North American psychiatrists interviewing American Indians after the death of a family
member. In many Indian tribes it is an expected and normal part of grieving to hear the
voices of the dead talking to them. He states: "This experience does not portend any
dire consequences such as psychosis, protracted depression, or other complications of
bereavement" (p.11). In South Africa, within the Xhosa culture, a person might
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experience "delusions" and "hallucinations" of communicating with his or her ancestors
as a calling to undertake training as a sangoma (a "condition" referred to as ukuthwasa).
As with the American Indians, this would then not necessarily count as psychosis, since
this term has to it an implicit qualitative judgement of illness, badness or abnormality.
A psychiatric diagnosis is not a thing in the world as is assumed by a positivist use of
language. Kleinman (1991) writes:
Observation is inseparable from interpretation. ...Psychiatric diagnoses derive
from categories. They underwrite the interpretation of phenomena which
themselves are conjeries of psychological, social and biological processes.
Categories are the outcomes of historical development, cultural influence and
political negotiation. (p.12)
Categories and diagnoses are man-made. They were written in time frames, by humans
with faces and hands, and mothers and fathers and children, and dreams and fears ...
and they should be recognised as such: valuable, vulnerable. For me, this would mean
acknowledging the categories (for example, Annie having all the symptoms of PTSD),
and at the same time remembering that these categories are not all there is to
psychological evaluation and therapy. These categories have thin, blurry lines that
separate them from each other and from other ways of meaning making in the world. It
is then useful to hold the tension between the "strength" as well as the "weakness" of
these categories, both in the conceptualisation of the patient as well as in the
therapeutic conversation.
Professional and lay views
Parker et al. (1995) argue that professional knowledge or expert knowledge is usually
privileged above patients' experiences and their accounts thereof. For example, we
need to take the depressed or psychotic patient's narrative about his situation with a
pinch of salt, since he is not really accountable. Adam's story, or stories, get obscured
because of the frequency of change in his "clinical picture". We reach the conclusion
that, because we cannot understand him, there is no sense to his story. His story is
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regarded as "non-sense", justifying the conclusion that he is manipulative. The premium
placed on collateral information might also imply that the value of Adam's story is
undermined. Do we see the story Adam's sister tells as another perspective alongside
his (thereby ascribing equal value to both), or is it seen as a super-narrative obscuring
the story that he tells?
Again, an option would be turning the opposition between professional and lay views
around, privileging patients' or lay views, and subordinating professional knowledge.
This does not really help, because psychologists study long and hard to accumulate as
much knowledge as possible about their field of interest and practice. This is what
makes them accountable professionals. To obscure this training would be both unfair
and unhelpful to everyone. Yet, it can happen that professionals get so caught up in
their credentials and "ultimately superior knowledge" that they do not leave any room for
other narratives, especially the patient's narrative. And this, I believe, is mistaken. But to
say that the patient's account must be the only kind of narrative that is important, would
be marginalising and silencing the clinician's voice, which would also be mistaken.
Rather, instead of seeing one as above the other with a neat horizontal line in between,
it would be more conducive to good practice to view them as two accounts (sometimes
overlapping, sometimes not) in the same sphere. Different yes, but not with one being
"better" and the other being "worse".
In the same way that professionals are taught to speak a certain language and taught to
operate within a certain cultural language (which also leads to the breakdown of the
privileging of this term), so-called lay people are also taught a certain cultural language
regarding psychological problems. I always find it interesting when patients arrive with
self-descriptive terms like "feeling severely depressed", or "only being hypomanic", or
"experiencing a Mars and Venus conflict in their marriage". Others may use different
culturally available terms. In the South African context, a patient complaining of
ukuthwasa also uses the language he knows to convey a certain meaning. These
different terms that are culturally available to different people are the languages in which
they have learned to make sense of their situations. Nowhere can we escape our
constructed nature and the dominant stories with which we have been nurtured.
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Professional knowledge is always also embedded in wider cultural stories, which again
touches on the idea that individual and cultural interpretation always determines and
mediates our standpoints and politics.
Professional and lay views are not always as different as professionals would want to
claim. This becomes evident looking at (a) the way professionals use lay terms among
themselves when speaking of a patient as "odd, weird, strange, mad, crazy, terrible",
and (b) the way "professional" knowledge is communicated to patients and their families.
Simplified, everyday concepts that are accessible to the lay person, are used
("intermediate typifications that bridge 'lay' concepts of mental illness and 'professional'
concepts") (Parker et al., 1999, p.66). Popular culture - images of "madness" on films,
television shows, in theatres, songs, newspapers - can be seen to have one foot in the
"professional realm" and the other in the "layman's world". How do psychologists present
themselves to the public, and how does the public re-present psychologists with an
image of how they are perceived or should be perceived? What do the images of the
psychologists who appear on talk shows, the cartoons drawn of therapists, and the kind
of books you find under the psychology section of bookstores tell therapists and the
public about how psychologists should be? The boundary between the professional and
the general lay view then becomes quite blurry, so that "(i)t no longer seems sensible to
talk of 'professional' or 'lay' concepts as separate things since the distinction between
them is not so much in the kinds of discourses used by speakers, but rather the position
from which they speak" (Parker et al., 1995, p.70).
Positions and power
"Power relations" and "subordination" make me think of politics in the more narrow
sense of the word. Are our hospitals and private practices one-dimensional regimes?
Are they despotic? Are they monarchies where everyone must bow to King Psychology?
Are there at all elements of democracy, liberal movements, progression, and striving
towards equality, fairness and justice?
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Hegel (in Gaarder, 1996) postulated a theory of the "development of history". He speaks
of a process of progress where one state or stage (the thesis) necessarily leads to a
counter state or stage (the anti-thesis). These two, the thesis and the anti-thesis, then
culminate into something higher and better: the synthesis (Gaarder, 1996). The
"conflict... is resolved by an intellectual transcendence" (Kenny, 1994, p.203). This
resolution then becomes the thesis for a new anti-thesis to be formed, and a new
synthesis to be made. This is an ongoing process of bettering, of political and historical
progress. Following from this theory, Fukuyama (1992) argued that history is not a
cyclical repetition of itself, but that there is a definite line of progression to be drawn
through the ages (a type of "political evolution"), with history reaching its "end" with the
"last men (sic) living in a liberal democracy" (p.ziii). If we think of psychology as part of
an evolving process of progression, what would we see as "the last men" and the "liberal
democracy"? A liberal democracy is built around the principles of reciprocal
acknowledgement, justice and abolishing power imbalances (Fukuyama, 1992).
However, it can be argued that there is an inherent assumption of the differences (and
the possible subsequent power imbalances) as being necessary for the mere functioning
of the mental health system (for example, oppositions like "therapist and patient",
"normal and abnormal", "sane and insane"). What would then happen if these
imbalances were ruled out? Nietzsche's Zarathustra speaks of these "last men" in the
following way: "Thus you speak: 'real we are entirely, and without belief or superstition'.
Thus you stick out your chests - but alas, they are hollow!" (in Fukuyama, 1992, p.303).
And this is what I believe deconstructing psychological practice is not trying to do. It is
not a mellowing out, an evening out of identities or people. It is not making psychologists
or patients "hollow men and women". It is a re-view of the construction of these men and
women, a re-view of how we think and how we have come to think like this, a review of
the lives of the power imbalances.
This implies that a road has been traveled for both therapist and patient. It means that
our knowledge did not fall from heaven, was not given ... but was made, and is being
made. It means that the interpretations and choices I make, will always be in some way
related to my history, my childhood and place of growing up, my place of education, my
teachers and lecturers, the books I have read and the conversations I have had. This
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puts my decision-making processes in psychological practice in a somewhat different
light. A "clinical judgement" is nothing but a decision, a decision that needs to take place
in what Derrida calls the moment of "undecidability". The "thing" that makes it a decision,
and that makes decision possible per se, is the fact that there could be different choices,
different roads to take. The fact that there is a moment where "the truth" or "the answer"
is ever absent, implies that every decision is a leap into the dark, a leap into uncertainty
(CilIers et al., 1999).
With every patient there are different roads to take, different possible lines of treatment,
medication and therapy. Every decision is made in a moment in which I actually cannot
decide, in a moment of undecidability. When I have a conversation with Annie, I can,
and have to, choose my response to everything she says. When she speaks of the rape,
and she states that she "constantly feels dirty", then there is a moment of undecidability
in which I have to decide between the many possible ways of reacting to this. I can
either choose to reflect her sense of contamination, I can choose to try and dispute this
thought, I can ask whether she has experienced this same feeling somewhere in her
past, I can ask what it means for her future. Of course, in the long run these options are
not mutually exclusive. However, in the second that I have to decide on my response, I
can choose only one for that particular moment. And the very thing that makes it a
decision, which implies that I need to take responsibility for it, is the fact that it happens
in a moment of undecidability, a moment of many options.
This is a moment where I decide and act to the best of my ability, even if I cannot claim
to know "the right answer", the "truth". When I give up the desperate search for the ever-
absent, ever-evasive "truth", there can be a moment of freedom from the narcissistic
self. Then, paradoxically, I can learn that "the only truth lies in learning to free ourselves
from insane passion for truth" (Eco, 1998, p.491). Being aware of undecidability and the
ever-evasive nature of "truth", will help me as therapist to be able to hold the tension
between knowing and not knowing, between deciding and knowing that I actually cannot
decide. It will prompt me into a more respectful stance towards Annie's and Adam's
stories, it will keep my eyes open for possible injustice done in the shrinking of their
stories in order to pen down "the truth". It will push me into the direction of a more just
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work ethics. It will turn my attention to evaluating and re-evaluating the law of the ward.
Yet, paradoxically, the striving for justice might be the very starting point for my
deconstruction, for my looking again ...
Justice
Derrida (in Caputo, 1997) writes:
Justice is not the law. Justice is what gives us the impulse, the drive or the
movement to improve the law, that is, to deconstruct the law. Without a call for
justice we would not have any interest in deconstructing the law. (p.125)
Progress or improvement is thus equated with deconstruction, implying that
deconstruction is not a spinning around and a never-ending rumination. There is some
agenda: improvement. Caputo (1997) writes about anti-deconstructionists' "good
conscience" or presumed "ethical responsibility" (p.125) to prevent deconstruction from
corrupting the youth, from filling the streets and the houses and the courts. This is done
in the name of "justice", so that law and order can be kept intact. There is an underlying
assumption that total anarchy will rule once deconstruction breaks the rule. There is an
assumption that words (for example, within the realm of psychological language,
"depressed" or "traumatised" or "psychotic") will lose all meaning, and that no talk will be
possible. Caputo (1997) writes that there is a "misbegotten notion that deconstruction is
some kind of random intellectual violence, a merely destructive and negative assault on
anything still standing" (p.127). This seems to arise from a "failure to see what
deconstruction affirms, a failure to see that every deconstructive analysis is undertaken
in the name of something, something affirmatively un-deconstructable" (p.128).
So rather than saying that deconstruction is against the law, it would probably be more
correct to say that deconstruction is justice (Caputo, 1997). This seems like a strange
statement, because in theory we any sentence of the sort "deconstruction is X" has an a
priori ring of "wrongness" to it (Hepburn, 1999, p.641), some non-compliance with its
own laws. This might be the feeling one gets in general when justice is set up as the
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"undeconstructable". Does Derrida revert to an age-old metaphysical idea or ideal, some
telos or some ultimate phenomenon? Or is there something different at work here?
It seems as if deconstruction in fact needs some undeconstructable purpose in order to
be. This links up with the idea of undecidability that I have already mentioned: we need
the moment of undecidability for decisions to be made. Similarly, if it were not for some
inner "striving forward" (some wish for improvement of the law) there would be no
reason to deconstruct. Justice becomes the instruction to deconstruction. As Caputo
(1997) argues:
Everything in deconstruction is driven by the undeconstructable, fired and
inspired, inflamed and impassioned, set into motion by what is not
deconstructable. Deconstruction is internally related to the undeconstructable and
is incoherent without it. What is undeconstructable - justice, the gift, hospitality ...
- is neither real or ideal, neither present nor future-present, neither existent nor
idealizable, which is how and why it incites our "desire", driving and impassioning
deconstruction. .. .Deconstruction is affirmative of something undeconstructable,
but it is affirmative without being "positive". It is affirmative beyond the distinctions
between positive and negative, foundational and anti-foundational, faith and
reason. (p.129)
Justice is thus somewhere on the horizon, maybe just out of reach, but always already.
Like a promise.
Equating of the Derridian notion of justice with a metaphysical, Platonian "super-idea"
would thus not be just to Derrida, or do his theory complete justice. For although justice
is undeconstructable, it falls under the law of différence: it is always already but never
quite. It is not necessarily some higher ideal, but rather an embodiment, a non-dualistic
"worldliness" that is and is not. "Justice is not the infinitely remote idea of a goal to be
reached, but it is something which, here and now, gives us orders beyond any given
sets of legal concepts" (Cilliers et al., 1999, p.282).
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Derrida (in Caputo, 1997) describes this "embodiment" as follows:
Justice, if such a "thing" "exists", is not a thing. Justice is not a present entity or
order, not an exiting reality or a dream, nor is it even an ideal eidos toward which we
earthlings down below heave and sigh while contemplating its heavenly form. Justice
is the absolutely unforeseeable prospect (a paralysing paradox) in virtue of which the
things that get deconstructed are deconstructed. Thus, deconstruction is made
possible by a twofold, conjoint condition:
(a) The deconstructability of law, of legality, or legitimization, makes
deconstruction possible.
(b) The undeconstructability of justice also makes deconstruction possible,
indeed is inseparable from it.
(c) The result is that deconstruction takes place in the interval that separates
the undeconstructability of justice from the deconstructability of ... authority,
legitimacy and so on. (p.132)
Thus, also in the context of psychology, the possibility of deconstruction, and
improvement towards more justice, is relying on the undeconstructability of justice, the
deconstructability of everything else (for example, the power imbalances inherent in the
relationship between "normality" and "pathology"), and the relationship between the two.
Yet, "deconstruction does not set its sight on justice as the goal or telos within a positive
horizon of foreseeability" (Caputo, 1997, p.133). If I understand right (!) then Derrida
says that justice is not only possible ("always already") but also "impossible". The
"impossible" (the "never quite") is the tension of pushing against and beyond the limits of
the horizon - an opening up of the horizon, a "cracking of nutshells" so to speak. So that
"...justice solicits us from afar, from the future, from and as a future always structurally to
come, calls 'come' to us, preventing the walls from the present from enclosing us in the
possible" (Caputo, 1997, p.135). Justice or improvement of the current law, can only




In my interaction with Annie in therapy, this would mean that my idea of wanting to be
"just" cannot be a far-away, ever unreachable, ever inaccessible concept. Yet, there can
also not be a cheap embodiment of justice. On the one hand, I cannot say that I will
never have a moment of justice in therapy (because of the "impossibility" of reaching
such a distant metaphysical idea). On the other hand, I cannot sit back in a self-satisfied
way, believing that justice was present in my every word spoken to Annie, just because I
hope for it to be like this. Rather, there must be a holding of this tension of justice being
"always already but never quite". This would imply a constant awareness from my side
to reach something that is in a way impossible to reach. But, paradoxically, in trying to
reach it, my goal shifts. I do not want to arrive at justice anymore. Rather, my goal is to
choose to be on my way towards justice, to be aware of justice "calling" me. This is a
liberating mind shift, that allows for my freedom, yet urges me towards accountability
and a constant striving for being more just in my interactions with Annie and Adam.
Now what?
Having spoken about the pronounced way in which modernist oppositions surface in the
profession of psychology, I wonder whether I as a therapist am not perhaps in an
impossible fix. Do I find myself in a paralysed state of inertia, a no-win prospect, with no
hope of progression or improvement of the law in psychology? Will I always be shackled
by these oppositions if I stay within the profession of psychology? Will there ever be
some sort of "liberal democracy" wherein Annie, Adam and I can stand and speak on
equal ground?
In the practice of psychology, there will always be the rule of imbalances, difference.
There will always be different roles that are played, different places where people stand
and position themselves. (For example, I am the therapist, Adam is the patient, and if I
also were to take the role of patient, it could become very confusing for both him and
me.) In order for meaning(s) to be made, differences have to exist. Otherwise Adam and
I might find ourselves in the undesirable position of Nietzsche's "hollow men" who
indeed stick out their chests, but have no substance. However, the necessity of
difference does not mean that I as therapist have to find myself in a state of inertia. On
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the contrary ... there can, and has to be, movement. There can be a striving forward,
impassioned by the desire for justice.
Similarly, undecidability does not mean I cannot decide and that I cannot use my
knowledge and training. Even though I am constantly in moments of undecidability, even
if deconstruction is never-ending, "the injunction to intervene, to take responsibility is
here and now absolutely urgent. You can't wait. So, deconstruction is endless, but you
have to respond here and now to the leap [into decision], to the gap [of undecidability]"
(Cilliers, 1999, p.281).
So I decide, I proceed with therapy ... and this is the ethical, therapeutic thing to do. With
Annie and Adam, I must calculate, I must get a good history, an idea of how previous
medications or psychotherapeutic modes worked for them. I must "plot" their stories and
draw up a "map" of the territory in order to find my way around. I must find out from
Annie what she wants from therapy, I must calculate her agenda. I have to calculate my
agenda. I also must calculate on an academic level in an accountable manner, by being
aware of what is going on in the field of psychology research-wise ... And then I must
remember that the "clinical judgements", decisions and diagnoses I make, are still made
in the "gap" of undecidability. With Adam, I will choose constantly to the best of my
abilities how to do therapy, while at the same time knowing that it is a decision made in
the moment of undecidability. It is a decision that has to be re-evaluated. There is
constant movement. The map can change as Adam and I spend more time in
therapeutic conversation. Nothing is cast in stone ... not even diagnosis, as Adam indeed
showed throughout the course of his treatment.
Clinicians in the psychological professions constantly have to function in these moments
where the idea(l) of the diagnostical mould is broken by "atypical presentations of
pathology". In these moments, that which is referred to as "clinical judgement" and
"clinical decision making" is highlighted. In these moments justice have to take place.
Justice is not a fixed entity which already has been determined to be there or not the
day the doors of the ward were opened (or closed): it is not tangible and can not be
found in the little "law book" of the ward. It has to happen, in the moments of
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undecidability, where justice is done to "judgement" and judgement is seen for what it is:
judgement. This emphasises that the term "judgement" implies a reading of the situation
on the part of the "judge". It implies that the judge, in this case the psychologist, is a
person with a history of other readings and judgements behind her... and that her
judgement did not fall from heaven as the master narrative in the story of psychology.
This implies an injury to the narcissistic self, where there can be a respectful making of
space for "the other". So, to say "that deconstruction is justice is not a quiet equation. It
does not mean that deconstruction is just. Justice is deconstructive, deconstructing ... "
(Cilliers et al., 1999, p.282).
In striving towards justice, there is a constant play between stability and movement,
between acknowledging and challenging certain discourses. There is a constant
interaction between the "set-ness" of diagnostic categories and that which challenges it.
If there were no ambiguities, no non-fitting clinical examples, we would probably still
have been with DSM-I. That which does not fit the mould or form, that which challenges
the form, then (sometimes) gets written into the next version of the DSM. It gets written
into another form or mould, so that that which did not fit previously, now becomes part of
the new criteria for "fitting". In the current DSM, for example, there are lengthy
discussions on PTSD that has developed after a once-off stressor. Yet, people who are
chronically traumatised, like children growing up in very violent and dangerous
neighbourhoods, challenge this diagnosis. They might show some PTSD symptoms, but
not necessarily all of them. Avoidant behaviour, for example, might be less pronounced
Gust because avoidance would not be possible). Dissociative symptoms (like
"depersonalisation") might be more pronounced. They do not really fit into the category
of "pure" PTSD (if there is such a thing). It is thus understandable that there has been
ongoing debate in the last decade about diagnoses like "Chronic Stress Disorder", or
"Personality change due to trauma". Conversation has been initiated exactly because
there was news of difference, something that did not fit the mould perfectly. There is a
need to include this news of difference in diagnostic conceptualisations, possibly in the
next DSM. In this way we probably would be able to write diagnostic manual after
diagnostic manual, in a dynamic way Hegel would have described as dialectical.
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With regards to diagnosing even when we are aware of what we can do by diagnosing
(for example, giving someone a lifelong label of Schizophrenia), the "then what" question
becomes of utmost importance. Must we, can we, use diagnoses, or should it all be
thrown out? Do we push out the ambiguous symptoms and stories to the margins so
that the purity of our diagnostical categories does not become contaminated? Do we
allow space for alternative stories that might challenge the security of the constricted
diagnostical categories that we use?
I agree with Kleinman (1991) that diagnoses have usefulness: certain conditions are
treatable, and without appropriate treatment more pain and suffering is caused. Annie's
diagnosis of PTSD might indicate to her doctor that a specific antidepressant would be
the most appropriate pharmacological intervention, and to me as her therapist that some
sort of exposure or talking about the rape might be appropriate. Specific psychotic
disorders might show a better response on certain medications or forms of treatment.
Then it can be useful to bear the patient's diagnosis in mind when deciding on the best
possible intervention.
On the other hand, diagnostic systems and mental health professionals can become
pawns in bureaucratical social control - which is not conducive to anyone's mental
health. The function of something like cultural analysis (or deconstruction) is then "to
continually remind us of these dilemmas" (Kleinman, 1991, p.17), and to remind us of
the moments of undecidability. Especially in a multi-cultural country like South Africa
such cultural analysis is of utmost importance. Kleinman (1991) writes:
[Cultural analysis] makes us sensitive to the possible abuse of psychiatric
labels ... it encourages humility in the face of alternative cultural formulations of
the same problem... it works against dehumanizing pigeonholing. An
anthropological sensibility regarding the cultural assumptions and social uses of
the diagnostic process can be an effective check on its potential misuses and
abuses. Irony, paradox, ambiguity, drama, tragedy, humor - these are the




These are the things that keep me from reducing Annie's identity to that of "a depressed
patient with PTSD". These are the things that keep her a person, with rich and complex
story lines that deserve respect. (The difference between regarding Annie as patient or
person becomes evident also in the way I have learned to speak. When I refer to her as
a patient, it would be easy to speak of "my patient". However, if the term "person" is
used it seems quite inappropriate to speak of "my person". Although the possessive
pronoun can be an indication of intimacy, closeness and care, it can also stand for a
therapist's sense of "possession" of the patient, as if the patient "belongs" to the
therapist. ... ) Part of the process of therapy might be situated within the respectful
acknowledgement of the other dimensions Annie has as a person, her other strengths
and struggles. This ties up with the agenda of deconstruction: "deconstruction is respect,
respect and affirmation of the other, it is a way to delimit the narcissism of the self, it is
making space to let the other be" (Caputo, 1997, p.44).
In this making of space, a world of "dappled things" can be born and acknowledged.
And from these "dappled things" can be born what Frosh (2000) calls "creativity,
spontaneity, even love ... things that require fertilisation, the breaking of perfection, the
disruption of purity ... " (p.56). To be creative and spontaneous, even to love, can form a
substantial part of the therapeutic relationship. At the end of Annie's sessions with me,
while reflecting back on therapy, she mentioned that the best moments for her were
those where I just "was a person" with her. These were the times I just sat with her when
she cried, when I laughed with her about something funny she told me, when we sat
side by side, each drawing half of the coping cards we were working on. These
moments of spontaneity formed part of the bigger therapeutic intervention. I do not want
to simplify matters by contributing Annie's positive experience of therapy only to these
moments ... yet I must listen to the feedback she is giving me. In my mind, her
experience that her "dappled narrative" was respected, made a valuable difference for
her. As therapist I had to act even and always in moments of not knowing for sure, in
moments of the "disruption of purity", both in terms of diagnosis and therapy.
When looking at this difficulty of "diagnosing for sure", Shawver (2000) poses the "now
what" dilemma that critical psychologists often face, in the following way:
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What do professionals, who have learned how to diagnose mental illness
according to the established rule, yet dislike the illness categories, do? Do they
just stand up at their job sites and say, "Never again"? Do they roll their eyes
when their colleagues discuss "borderlines" or "multiple personalities"? Do they
shrug their shoulders when new private clients want diagnoses so they can use
their insurance for payment? Or do they simply go through the exercise of
diagnosing clients even though they feel that this is a destructive practice?
(p.192)
Indeed, this is the difficult position I identify with. It is the dilemma of having to decide
either to step out of the system I am critical of, thereby making a point in a very radical
way, or staying on, which could signify some sort of silent approval of the system.
However, it would be a one-dimensional view of staying on that depicts it only as such.
Staying on can also mean a commitment to reform and improve, even if it does mean
suffering the discomfort of an imperfect system. I agree with Shawver's (2000)
conclusion: critical psychologists must be careful not to "shoot themselves in the foot"
(p.193) when being critical in a too idealistic way. She believes that "refusing to
diagnose can be contrary to the political aim [of improving the system]" (p.192). When
critical psychologists step out of the system that they are critical of, they make room for
less critical professionals to take their posts, thus in fact "forsaking" their original agenda
of bettering the system. Only by staying on can critical clinicians propose change,
indeed from the inside out and not from the outside in. The trick is then "to learn to
balance our conscience with our authentic judgement about the practicalities that
present themselves to us... " (p.193). This is, in my opinion, a very personal struggle of
every individual. A very difficult struggle also, a constant learning, never arriving at the
point of truth one day. It is a struggle that constantly presses us to be aware of the
moments of undecidibility. Whenever I am humbled in the knowledge that my knowledge
is made and mediated, that my decision making takes place in quite an uncomfortable
gap, it opens up new avenues towards what I would like to call "justice" ...
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To give or not to give?
Following from this, Caputo (1997) comments on the idea of justice as a gift. The
"economy of giving" (p.143) means that when I give you a gift, and both you and I know
that I am giving it as such, I actually oblige you to say "thank you", and I make you
indebted to me. Therefore, you have to give something back (for example, a "thank you"
or another gift) to equalise the difference that I have set up by giving you something. In
German, this paradoxical "economy" is beautifully illustrated in the words die Gift
vergiftet (the gift poisons). Is giving then at all possible? Not if both you and I know that I
am giving you something, Derrida would argue. Only if neither of us knows that it is a
gift, when we are not aware of the economy of giving, we can give ... In fact, giving as
conscious act then seems to become an impossibility, and for exactly this reason it
becomes desirable, and pushes against the limits of the possible horizons of the gift
economy. Gift and economy need not be mutually exclusive... indeed, the "double
injunctive, and the double bind, is this: Give, but know that the gift, alas, turns back into
a circle ..... (Caputo, 1997, p.148).
In terms of psychology, there is a gift economy in helping patients like Adam and Annie
"get better". In therapy there is a reciprocal gift of meaning making. Psychotherapeutic
effectiveness can be seen to rest on the therapist's capacity to give meanings back to
the patients in a manner that makes their own meanings clearer. But in order to "mirror"
meaning in such a way that the patient's sense of meaning grows and deepens, the
therapist needs something from the patient. Annie needs to "give" me the gift of her
story in order for me to give back a process of meaning making.
The gift economy is also played out on another level. The helper (I, as therapist) is
helped: the patient stays indebted (also financially!). But then, if the original helper, I as
the psychologist, is then helped in this process, I become the "helpee" ... who is indebted
to the original patient for the gift of help! Could the economy of giving in a sense be self-
equilibrating? Or does it turn the very idea of "the gift .. into some kind of non-entity, some
paralysed no-thing, even some impossibility? Again this links with justice: "the passion
for justice and the passion for the gift come together in and as the passion for the
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impossible" (Caputo, 1997, p.149). Giving back in obligation is not a gift, in the same
way that justice under some kind of obligation to be just to someone else, just because
he has previously shown you justice, is not justice. Then it becomes law, which is
neither justice nor gift.
What is the trick then? Caputo (1997) feels that "we must learn both to 'give' and also to
give economy a chance" (p.151). We find ourselves in the gap between the gift and
economy, in the same way we find ourselves between justice and the law ... trying to
"relieve the hard structures of the law with the gentleness of a gift" (p.151). As therapist I
find myself then in the ambiguous position that, in my interaction with Annie, I must then
be both unaware and aware of my "gift" of time and energy. In order for it to be a true
gift, I must not even skim over the idea in my head that I am the "rich one" providing for
her from out my treasuries. It must be so natural that, in a way, the economy is not
contemplated. This gift of mine to the patient has to go by unnoticed (even by me),
humbly. On the other hand, I cannot un-know, and I have to keep in the back of my mind
the thought that I must be careful not to keep her in an indebted place. Therefore, for me
as therapist, there must be both an awareness and unawareness of giving.
In terms of the phrase die Gift vergiftet, an interesting situation would occur if the patient
experiences therapy or medication as a kind of "poison" (die Gift), while the therapist
sees it as a gift (also die Gift). This might mean that some kind of "poisoning" is
necessary in order to heal. Many patients, Annie for example, indeed choose this: she
comes to therapy (even if it is difficult, "poisonous") in order to heal, to get better. She
makes herself a gift by choosing to go the road of facing the inner poison. Other patients
may come kicking and screaming, not making the meaning of their treatment being a
gift. Logically these scenarios become complex. In terms of the economy of the gift,
would this "ignorance" then imply that something of the impossibility of giving is coming
nearer because the gift is not perceived as such? Or is it again a privileging of the
person in power: if the psychologist perceives treatment as a gift, but not the patient, are
we not plunging knee-deep into a reconstitution of these power differentials?
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Deconstructing these power relations then again becomes an instruction to the critical
psychologist. I am not going to write about the theoretical modality of narrative therapy
extensively in this letter, but I believe that many of the principles as propagated by
deconstruction find a practical application in this way of conceptual ising and doing
therapy. With its focus on respecting the individual's experience, on the therapist's "not
knowing", on externalising the problem and seeking "unique outcomes" and new
avenues, narrative therapy gives a voice to the striving towards justice (White, 1989).
In a way, it is easy to speak of deconstruction and respect and liberation when I speak
of outpatients, individuals and families that are "relatively" "sane", still coping with going
to school, going to work, coming to therapy. Then their reality and my reality are not that
far removed from each other, and it is actually not necessarily that uncomfortable
making room for multiple narratives. But what happens in the interaction between
clinician and patient when the meeting takes place in an inpatient hospital setting, when
the patient's functioning is "severely debilitated", when discharge is still miles away,
when the patient is "floridly psychotic"?
Psychosis
Psychosis is a difficult concept for me. In a way it scares me, because I do not know it.
The slow and sad grayness of depression I can grasp, the twitch of anxiety, the
frustration and anger and happiness of relationships ... But psychosis I do not know. I
can only imagine, without knowing whether my imaginings are remotely related to "true
psychosis". I find myself in more or less the same uncomfortable "not knowing" that
Bottoms (2000) writes of in his story about his "brother's descent into madness":
I had no understanding of paranoid schizophrenia that day [of my brother's
diagnosis]- its massive delusions, the hallucinations, the blending of colour and
sound, the accumulation of facts... and how they came together to form
completely new and alternative notions of self and reality ... It was years before I
felt I had any understanding, and then only some, because the mind of another is
44
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ultimately unknowable, you can only approximate it with metaphor, invention,
language, story. (p.93)
It is in this finding of metaphor, which is language, that the difficulty of the psychosis lies
for me, and where the feelings of being helpless, small, inadequate and un-
understanding originate.
Yet, psychosis lures me nearer, perhaps in the same wayan abyss lures someone
afraid of heights. Pirsig (1979) states that "present-day reason is an analogy of the flat
earth of the medieval period ... If you go too far beyond it you're presumed to fall off,
into insanity. And people are very much afraid of that ... " (p.171). I am thus in a constant
tug-af-war between wanting to leave this abyss alone, yet longing to peer over, to gain
some sort of understanding of it.
This strange fascination is one of the reasons I want to pursue this road, the road of
bringing a deconstruction of master narratives and power relations into the realm of
making talk with psychotic patients. Yet I have wondered whether I should embark on
this journey now, near the end of my letter. I have considered deleting or undoing these
pages, because the topic is perhaps too difficult. Yet, in the context of this letter, it does
not seem right to shy away from that which does not fit the mould, from that which is too
troublesome and difficult and tricky. Therefore then, this tampering with this complex
phenomenon.
Seeing and hearing things
Seeing and hearing things that others do not see or hear, being convinced of things
others can only scorn at, having a "reality" that is not reality, can be daunting to both the
therapist and the psychotic patient. Yet the question can be asked: according to which
reality do these judgements of other realities take place? In our postmodern world the
idea of multiple realities are not that weird anymore: we live in an age in which virtual
realities are shaped on a daily basis by computers, by editing, cutting and pasting. Films
like Sliding Doors (Pollock, 1999) and The Matrix (Silver, 1999) explore ideas of parallel
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universes, space travel and life on a completely different level, in a completely different
reality. In The Truman Show (Edwards, 1998), the main character lives in a reality that is
as unreal as can be, a reality constructed purely for the sake of entertainment of
television viewers in "the real reality". This film leaves the viewer with an uncomfortable
sense of skepticism regarding the assumed "real" boundaries of her assumed "real
world". What if we are all but players who have been seduced and deceived by the
apparent realness of the reality we have been "thrown" into?
Dreams
Globus (1995) explores this concept of "thrown-ness" when he writes about
"postmodernism and the dream", deconstructing the great divide between our waking
and our sleeping worlds. Heidegger's concept of Geworfenheit (in Globus, 1995) is used
when describing the nature of the human condition. We always and already find
ourselves being "thrown" (geworfen) into the world - not choosing, not pre-
contemplating whether we want to be here, where and when we want to be born. But, in
our everyday business and being-in-the-world we forget our thrown-ness, we come
under a (false) sense of security and firm ground. We live in "forgetfulness of being",
which has the convenient consequence of our not being overcome by an existential
Sartrean nausea.
In our dreams we are very much experiencing a sense of thrown-ness: in sleep we do
not choose which fantasies and which realities enter our dream worlds. Sometimes we
wake up, terrified of the images our "dream weavers" (Yalom, 2000, p.8?) have conjured
up. Sometimes we wake up with soft smiles, remembering the unplanned, uncalculated
mystery of a soothing dream. Sometimes we simply amazed at the crazy way apparently
non-related people and events and emotions are mixed up into an (in)credible dream
story.
Our dreams "highlight our postmodern and existential thrown-ness" (Globus, 1995,
p.123). This thrown-ness that is characteristic of the human condition is also highlighted
in plays such as Rosenkrantz and Guildenstern are dead (Stoppard, 1991). In this
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story, two peripheral characters from Hamlet (Shakespeare, 1994) suddenly find
themselves right in the middle of the world of Elsinore. They try to figure out who on
earth they are, what they are doing there and who the guy pacing up and down,
mumbling "to be or not to be" on the periphery, is. They are situated within the "horizons"
of Elsinore. In the same way, every human is situated within his or her "pragmatic
horizon" (Globus, 1995, p.123) - even when this horizon is constantly in a Herocleitic
flux, in a type of "always already but never quite". We live and interpret and understand
and make meaning within a constantly shifting horizon, within a frame with blurry lines.
Yet, this stays a horizon, a frame. Thus, in waking and sleeping, we can never
understand as in "looking from above and seeing it ali", we can never claim to be all-
knowing. We know only within horizons. (This again, is a call for a respect for the other,
for making space for that which might be part of another, different horizon.)
Globus (1995) writes of being in a non-reflective position in a dream - one is
"enraptured" (being seized) and does not stand back to reflect on choices made or
persons entering the dream. There is a complete immersion in the world of the dream. In
contrast, reflection is "a common occurrence in waking" (p.125). He postulates that the
dream rapture is only different from waking life in degree: in waking too, we are "seized"
by our situatedness, our thrown-ness. (Yet, paradoxically, it seems that we have to
reflect in order to notice our captivity, our enrapturement. There is a tension between
rapture and reflection. This paradox is similar to the paradox of giving naturally and
unknowingly, while at the same time being aware of the gift economy. In everyday life
and as therapist, I am both reflecting and enraptured. I have to give in an "enraptured"
way (naturally), as well as in a reflecting, aware way.)
However, if a person is always enraptured, always seized by the life world and its
phenomena without any reflection, it could be problematic. Could psychosis be another
way of describing complete immersion in what is experienced as reality? In the world of
psychosis, as in the world of dreaming, there is a quality of "unreality", of some break
with what is presumed to be real and true. Therefore, that which has been said about
the thrown-ness, the pragmatic horizons and the sometimes dysjointed character of
dreams, can also be applied to the world of psychosis. Psychosis, as dreams, highlights
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our ontological state. This entails an intense involvement and enrapturement in the
world, far from the "cool observation and detachment that is idealized in the white
coated scientist" (Globus, 1995, p.125). Our situated ness is believed to have a here-
and-now Zuhanden quality. Globus states:
We are fascinated by our waking projects: we care about things, care about what
happens. Everything matters. Care is ontological. ... Even for the borderline
patient, for whom nothing matters, it matters that nothing matters ... both
rationalism and romanticism miss the deeper significance of our waking rapture,
the care that permeates our waking being. ...We are in both waking and
dreaming seized by the world our meanings create. But it is in dreams that we
see this more clearly since here "care" is shown in its purest form, unopposed by
reflection. Dream rapture is thus emblematic of the postmodern emphasis on
care. Our meanings captivate us... and to be so captivated is the human
condition. Typically, this captivity is transparent, we do not notice as we live it.
(p.126)
Care as an ontological given is thus exemplified in dreaming. The same holds for
psychosis. Have you ever met a psychotic patient who could not care less about what is
happening in her world? On the contrary, she is very concerned about the happenings in
her reality, very worried about the people in her "delusional world". She is thrown into a
reality in which she really cares, in which she has no other choice but to care. In the
non-psychotic world too, caring is weaved into the human fabric. In fact, if we were not
beings-of-care, then there would be no reason for the existence of psychology as
profession. For if people did not care, they would not become "depressed", or "anxious",
or "angry", or "personality-disordered". If I did not care, I would not have chosen to be a
psychologist. If Annie did not care, the rape and the other traumas she has experienced
would not really have mattered. Because she cares, she suffers, and wants something
to become better, to heal.
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Conversation: always a possibility?
In the previous writings about "patients" and "professionals" and Annie and Adam and
"justice and care", I have propagated a therapeutic stance that encourages respectful
conversation. In this dialogue, the voices of both therapist and patient are heard. Their
stories meet, their narratives stand next to each other. But what happens if a patient
seems to be so psychotic that no such conversation seems possible?
In my work as an intern this year, I have had the experience of having to clerk the
particulars of a young girl (let me call her Zelda) who was "floridly psychotic". This
process took much longer than planned, because she seemed unable to enter into
dialogue, that is, the dialogue that I foresaw when I went to see her originally.
Whenever I asked a question, she derailed to another tangent. Whenever I used an
expression she liked, she echoed it quite a few times. She often answered my questions
("For how long have you been feeling like this?" or "Is there anyone else in your family
the experiences the same difficulties that you do?") with questions that were
preoccupied with religious content ("Are you an angel?", "Am I God?" and "Are you
God?"). (For Zelda, the content of the delusions and hallucinations - what she was
experiencing - definitely seemed to be more important than their form - that she was
experiencing it.) It seemed to me as if my language and Zelda's language just did not
seem to be able to connect. It was as if she had her own idiolect, an idiolect I could not
enter. (Maybe she felt the same way about my language.) Meaningful conversation in
my language seemed impossible, because she could not really understand me.
Meaningful conversation in her language seemed impossible, because I could not really
understand her.
In the end I put away the little booklet I was supposed to fill in: this dialogue was not
going to happen. But what now? How can I find some common vocabulary, even if just
to make this a therapeutic interaction for Zelda? Can she and I find some form of
communication without dialogue? How can I care for her, give to her, be just and
respectful towards her? This is not an easy question. It does not have an easy answer. I
would, however, pose the idea that, in cases like these, a therapist's "being functions"
49
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
are usually more important than her "doing functions". In Zelda's case, I had to try to
trust in the value of just being with her. I had to give up the idea that my very specific
words can bring change, I had to let go of the safety I sometimes find in using the "right
phrases", the "right, therapeutic words", the "right questions". I had to explore another
language, the language of simply being, of simply spending time with someone.
Because to choose to spend time with someone is deeply respectful. It means that I
value Zelda. It means that I care enough to want just to be with her, even when there
are no words. It means that "just being" with someone can be a just way of being a
therapist. Even when my language and hers do not find a meeting place, there is a
meeting place on another level beyond the level of words. In this meeting place of
choosing to be with someone, healing can happen.
Again, I believe this is the case with all patients and not only psychotic patients. In this
way, the opposition where the non-psychotic patient and her language are privileged
above the psychotic patient and her language, is deconstructed. That which holds for
the psychotic, also holds for the non-psychotic. That which holds for Zelda, also applies
to Adam and Annie. Firstly, that meaning is always "never quite" and has to be co-
written constantly in every reading and conversation. Secondly, that for all people, care
is ontological, and thirdly, that in my choosing just to be with someone there can be a
communication of care and respect. This will take me further on the road towards the
"impossible": justice can be done and giving can happen in a therapeutic space that
deconstructs linguistic and political power relations and focuses on personhood rather
than patienthood. This can lead towards being the "better therapist" I wrote about in the
beginning of the letter.
A time to go
I think, Chris, that it is time to start to finish this letter. Somehow, after the initial
discussion of deconstruction, after telling some stories and deconstructing some
hierarchies, and after exploring the concepts of justice and care with regards to non-
psychotic as well as psychotic patients, I feel as if some sort of "closing" has been
reached. Now, even at this "ending", if it exists, I am aware that I do not have a feeling of
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arriving. I do not have the final answer, I cannot make a neat wrap-up remark, I cannot
conclude with a brief "take home message". Even if this were possible, I do not think it
would do justice to what I have written in this letter ...
I have written of many stories and many people. I have described the difficulty of
positioning myself, of uncomfortable spaces, deconstruction, differénce, undecidability,
professionals, patients, psychopathology and psychotherapy. I have told you about
Annie, Adam, Zelda, myself. I have written of striving towards justice, of being
passionate about responsible caring and giving, and of giving up the expert position and
the ideal of objectivity. I have reflected about respect, about laying the Narcissus in
myself to rest. I have written of the possibility of conversation and communication
between persons, also when their realities do not seem to be able to connect.
I have painted and framed this picture, or pictures ... Now I want it to be put up on a wall
somewhere - not as the end product or the grand finale, not as something completed in
itself. I want to place a little table next to this wall. On this table I want to leave a paint
brush or two, a glass of water, a myriad of paints with different textures and colours. I
want passers-by to look at the painting, to pick up a brush, to add a stroke or splash of
paint. I want them to be aware of their co-authoring and meaning making (which takes
place anyway, even if they just look at the picture and walk on) in a very tangible way.
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